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 The tension between modality-specific sensory processes and abstract 
concepts is an old one. The notion that one stratum of the mind has a modular 
organisation is rather recent. Not much attention has been paid so far to the way 
sensorial modality and mental modularity might combine. For example, Massaro 
(1987) argued that facts which transcend modality-specificity of speech present 
arguments against the modularity of mind. We have disagreed with this in the past (de 
Gelder and Vroomen, 1989), and in the present comment we pursue our analysis of 
the modality versus modularity debate, maintaining that both are orthogonal issues 
while there is, at the same time, room for modality-specificity within the realm of 
modular processes. The occasion for these remarks is the paper by Radeau (this 
volume). Materially, the paper is drawn from a series of studies over more than twenty 
years with Paul Bertelson, presenting beautiful experiments on audio-visual spatial 
interaction. Radeau tries to build a bridge between that research on sensory 
integration processes and the more recent notion of mental modules. The central 
claim of our comments is that issues of modality must be distinguished from issues of 
modularity. The reasons for keeping to this distinction are the same as the reasons for 
not assimilating the research on spatial integration with the research on the multi-





NOT lend support to the notion of a special module for audio-visual non-speech 
interactions. 
 
I. Modality versus modularity 
 Modality and modularity are complex and ambiguous notions. This ambiguity 
derives from the fact that the two pop up at various stages in psychological models of 
knowledge and in philosophical analyses of its foundations. Yet, the two notions can 
be used unambiguously when the nature of the explanation they figure in is made 
explicit. In what follows, we will rely on the one specific meaning of modality and 
modularity that is the essential one for the issues at stake.  
 Philosophers have traditionally been interested in modality-specificity, worrying 
whether the senses must be considered as anchors of knowledge or as sources of its 
contamination. Berkeley is a notorious example, with his claim that our knowledge 
begins and ends with experiences locked into sensorial modality-specificity. But in the 
context of present day empirical psychological theories, such a view on sensory 
specific knowledge is hard to place. The notion of modality-specificity that is of most 
immediate concern in psychological research relates to sense-specific coding of 
information, e.g., vision provides visual information, hearing provides auditory informa-
tion, etc. Note that we are not talking here about sensory objects, nor about sensory 
concepts, but only about sensory-specific featural information existing at a level of 
processing in which objects do not yet have existence. The differences between the 
modalities thus relate to differences in the physical properties they inform us about. In 
due course, information from the various modalities gets integrated and we achieve 
objective knowledge and entertain concepts, etc. Depending on one’s philosophical 
view and psychological theory, one may hold the view that modality-specificity 
percolates upward the information processing system all the way leading to a concept 
of e.g., a visual circle which is different from that of a haptic circle. 
 The alternative view is that modality-specificity begins and ends with the 
senses, and that what comes next is a matter of abstract concepts and propositional 
knowledge including knowledge about sensory objects. The research Radeau reminds 





processes, perceptions and cognitions in the accepted sense of these terms. For 
example, experiments were set up to examine conceptual influence on sensorial 
integration where subjects’ conceptual knowledge of what loudspeakers were for was 
the critical variable. If, just if, the notion of a mental module has a birthright, it hangs on 
the conceptual consistency and the empirical plausibility of a modular level of proces-
sing that is neither captured by sensory analysis nor by conceptual labour. 
 What, if anything, has changed with the arrival of modularity? Even if we push 
aside the epistemological issues and the way the modularity issue gets invested with 
epistemological nobility and its role in the great debate about theory-neutral 
observation (Fodor, 1984; de Gelder, in press), modularity is a still a very rich notion. 
There is little doubt that on the conceptual side, the leading notion motivating Fodor’s 
psychological theory is the Chomskyan notion of a module. On Chomsky’s account 
(see Chomsky, 1986), the notion of a module is central to the analysis of a speaker’s 
knowledge of language. The language module and its submodules are the 
grammatical theory and its separate subparts. The claim of psychological reality which 
combines with this notion of knowledge of language suggests that these analytical 
parts correspond to separate subtasks a language learner and a language processing 
subject is capable of. Whatever the differences between the explanatory project of 
linguistic theory and that of psychological theory in the business of figuring out how the 
mind goes about its daily job, this origin of the concept of a mental module cannot be 
ignored in the discussion since it is responsible for the one and only distinctive 
property of modularity, i.e., domain specificity. 
 Matters of modality of the senses are thus very different from issues of the 
modularity of mind. The distinctive characteristic of a module is its domain-specificity. 
Claims about modality relate to questions on the mode of information input and 
correspond to ways of carving information input up into sensorial regions. In contrast, 
claims about modularity carve information up into types of knowledge or more specifi-
cally and less ambiguously, into semantic domains. The contrast is thus no longer one 
between data-driven and concept-driven processes. Instead, one must now face up to 
a three layered picture with sensory states, modular states, and belief states. The 





processing that is intermediate between sensations and full blown concepts. Such a 
level might be called a level of shallow objects, shallow because not yet integrated in 
the network of real world knowledge. The example from language is helpful. 
Sensorially there are sounds, centrally there are meanings or concepts, while at the 
intermediate level there are linguistic objects or linguistic representations. 
 Modularity is thus not a claim to be taken lightly or to be given a relative 
interpretation, as if there were such a thing as being ’relatively domain-specific’. Of 
course, Fodor has somewhat inadvertently advertised modules as species one 
recognises by crossing off traits on a checklist. It is clear that matters of speed, 
impenetrability or pre-wiredness blur the picture of what a true module looks like, since 
they are found across the board off all information processes. The mechanism of 
audio-visual spatial integration appears to score on most of these traits, but that does 
NOT make it a module. For example, it is a trivial fact that sensory processing is not 
under conceptual or doxastic influence of the kind usually assimilated with a subjects’ 
cogitations. But that does not make it a module in the only sense that matters, i.e., a 
device that is operational in a specific semantic environment. The study of modular 
processing is that of the processing abilities of a system qua functional architecture, in 
its biological sense. The latter is likely to exhibit some degree of species specificity as 
the example from language does bring out. In contrast, the study of modality of input 
concerns physical properties of the stimulus input. Principles, Gestalt ones like 
grouping, common fate, and others or stimulus properties like signal intensity are 
general and found in vision just like in audition.  
 
II. Relations between audio/visual pairing and audio/visual speech 
 At first sight, it may look as if the pairing mechanism which underlies audio-
visual pairing of non-speech does fulfil the criteria of a Fodorian module in a similar 
way as the module for audio-visual speech appears to do. Indeed, both score high on 
Fodor’s checklist. But that is not the procedure that can settle the debate. What is 
critical is that the analysis of the audio-visual pairing mechanism requires a description 
of the object in its domain. And this, we argue, is not the case. Instead, audio-visual 





transcend and precede (or follow) domain specificity. They thus apply to both speech 
and non-speech input, but they are by themselves not part of a module. Gestalt 
principles may apply at a pre-modular or post-modular stage, but whatever the 
outcome, it seems clear that there is some kind of hierarchic organization such that 
Gestalt principles operate independent of modular processes. One can imagine that 
Gestalt principles operate at a pre-modular level such that they group perceptual 
primitives (uni-modal and multi-modal) into a unitary event. On the basis of such 
primitive grouping, the domain of the event might be inferred. For instance, formants 
might be grouped together because of similar onset/offset times (Darwin and 
Sutherland, 1984), and then referred to the speech module for speech processing.  
 Such a hierarchic perceptual organization has several consequences worth 
considering. The first is that rejections in the perceptual grouping of the primitives by 
the Gestalt principles percolate up to the domain-specific modular processes. For 
instance, it seems clear that auditory and visual speech will not be integrated if they 
are to a-synchronous, and, although there are to our knowledge no studies which have 
addressed this issue, it might also be the case that McGurk-like fusions will not occur if 
the locations of the auditory and visual information are to disparate. The refusal of the 
perceptual system to integrate these cross-modal inputs is caused at a non-modular 
stage at which Gestalt principles operate. They should thus also be found with other 
stimuli and modalities, like those for instance mentioned by Radeau. Indeed, it was 
found that bongo’s or light flashes cause adaptation and that recalibration is 
decreased if the spatial separation is increased. The Gestalt principles thus seem to 
operate across modalities and stimulus-domains in a non-specific way. 
 There are reasons of a different kind besides violations of Gestalt principles 
which prevent crossmodal interactions. One is that intra-modular resistance against 
cross-modal interactions will occur whenever one of the inputs does not match the 
domain of the module. For instance, Summerfield (1979) observed that auditory 
speech is not integrated with a Lissajou ring which corresponds to the centers and 
corners of the lips. Presumably, audio-visual integration of speech only occurs if the 
input of both modalities is processed as speech, and a Lissajou figure does not fulfil 





different: synchronicity and spatial adjacency are triggers for the Gestalt principles, but 
they are not sufficient to guarantee module-like audio-visual speech integration.  
 A further distinction between Gestalt principles and intra-modular interactions is 
that the former have their own signature, namely adaptation and recalibration. When 
two cues of the same perceptual parameter (e.g., depth, location etc) arrive at different 
values, adaptation, and later recalibration takes place. This situation is of course well 
demonstrated by the work of Radeau and Bertelson. However, adaptation and 
recalibration phenomena do not take place in the phonetic module. Thus, in the 
McGurck-situation, conflicting phonetic cues from audition and vision are presented, 
and the outcome is a more or less optimal solution which fits both information sources 
(Massaro, 1987; Vroomen, 1992). There is, however, in the McGurk-situation no 
adaptation to the strange combination of auditory and visual cues, and even more 
important, so far nobody has reported any evidence for recalibration processes. It thus 
looks that conflicting cues in the phonetic module are solved differently if compared 
with conflicting cues in the spatial or temporal domain: the former do not lead to 
recalibration, the latter do. This strongly suggests that audio-visual speech and audio-
visual pairing are two sides of two different coins: audio-visual speech is specific for 
the speech module, audio-visual pairing applies to audio-visual speech and to non-
speech in a non-domain-specific way. 
 
III. Modalities within modules 
  Modularity has challenged the traditional contrast between sensory modalities 
and abstract concepts. We now turn to another aspect of this challenge: the existence 
of modality-specificity within the module. The critical distinction needed to make room 
for modality in the modular mind is the one between pre-modular modality aspects 
versus post-modular modality aspects. Let us turn to aspects of cross-modality in 
relation to modularity and our analysis of McGurk-like conflicts already mentioned. 
One might argue that such interactions, whether integration, as in the spatial domain, 
or conflicts as in the speech domain, overrides our principled distinction between 
modalities or modules.  





the McGurck-illusion with the case of audio-visual pairing, since the former is most 
clearly a case of a domain specific conflict and since it shows that there still is modality 
after modularity. Evidently, there is only an integration problem because there is 
successful modular processing, and there is only conflict once the module has 
operated successfully, that is, once linguistic information has been extracted from the 
two sensory modalities. The conflict between the input from the two modalities would 
not occur if in each of the modalities the speech module had not detected linguistic 
information. Likewise it should be very clear that conflict and conflict resolution of the 
kind found in fusions and blends is a process under modular control and not a sensori-
al interaction of the kind so well illustrated by the Bertelson/Radeau research. Nor is it 
a conceptual integration issue, or a conflict whose origin or resolution is under 
conceptual control. 
 Empirical illustrations for the independence of modality and modularity come 
from cases of modular impairments in the absence of sensorial disorders as observed 
for example by Campbell (1993) and ourselves. We observed impairments in speech 
processing and in memory for speech input in developmental phonological dyslexics. 
This fact is intriguing because it concerns a modular impairment, i.e., in the speech-
processing domain. If poor readers suffer from phonological processing impairments, 
there is no reason to limit these to problems in the auditory modality. As a matter of 
fact, we have consistently found that in these subjects phonological impairments are 
also found when speech is lipread (de Gelder and Vroomen, 1988; de Gelder and 
Vroomen, in press, Vroomen, 1992). Modular impairments thus ignore sensory 
modalities but they do not jump domains. Similarly, a face processing deficit does not 
lead to a visual speech perception deficit (Campbell, this volume; de Gelder, Vroomen 
and van der Heide, 1991; de Gelder, Gepner, and de Schonen, submitted). Empirical 
evidence for modality-specificity within the speech module are for example found in 
studies on short-term memory of heard and lipread speech (de Gelder & Vroomen, 
1992; de Gelder & Vroomen, in press). 
 In conclusion, there was room for modality effects before modularity appeared. 
There is still just as much room for them when modularity is brought into the picture. 





assimilating the old modality effects to the new modularity notion, a new notion of 
post-modular modality effects might be needed. Moreover, modality effects from pre-
modular and post-modular processes are likely to be very different, computationally as 
well as neuropsychologically.  
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